Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) authorizes the appeal of a nonfinal order which determines “the right to immediate possession of property.”  This provision is to be narrowly construed.  Marina Bay Hotel and Club, Inc. v. McCallum, 733 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  In that case the Court stated:

Even if the trial court had granted the motion for summary judgment, the order would only have determined whether the lessees had an option.   It would not necessarily have ordered that the lessor get "immediate possession," as contemplated by rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii).

Id. at 1134.

Hence, the wording of a nonfinal order is critical in determining its appealability.  For example, an order simply granting or denying a request to appoint a receiver is not appealable.  Twinjay Chambers Partnership v. Suarez, 556 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Lee v. Lee, 407 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).  However, if the order states the receiver is entitled to immediate possession, then it is appealable. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Molko, 584 So.2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Thunderbird, Ltd. v. Great American Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Gateway, LTD., 566 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the Court held that an order approving leases entered into by receiver in mortgage foreclosure action was not subject to interlocutory review.  It noted that “immediate possession” of the property passed to the receiver by a previous order which was not appealed.    In Profile Investments, Inc. v. Delta Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 957 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), an appeal of a non-final order invalidating a tax deed was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order did not "directly determine the immediate right to possession of property.

The Second District Court of Appeal has made a distinction between orders that simply “pass upon”  issues concerning possession and orders that “determine” claims.  It held a denial of a motion for summary judgment in a case where homeowners brought an action to establish the superiority of their property rights over the County’s rights was not appealable because the claims remained “subject to determination at trial.”  Miami-Dade County v. Perez, 988 So.2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).  In Staten v. Gonzalez-Falla, 855 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court held that an order granting an easement was not appealable as the scope of the easement was still to be decided.